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Samuel Pepys and Corruption 
MARK KNIGHTS 
 
Picking up a theme that runs through David Hayton’s work, this article examines corruption 
in the later Stuart period through a case study of Samuel Pepys. The latter’s diary can be read 
alongside the public record of parliamentary inquiries and vilification in the press, allowing 
us a rare opportunity to study corruption simultaneously through the eyes of a perpetrator and 
his critics. Pepys reveals ambiguities in how corruption was defined and defended. At the 
same time as he criticized corruption in others, he took bribes and extorted favours but either 
lied about them when confronted, or excused them as lawful gifts from friends and those 
grateful for his services, arguing that his acceptance of them never worked against the king’s 
interest. His critics, on the other hand, queried the compatibility of his private advantage and 
the public interest, and depicted him as greedy, hypocritical and unjust. Pepys thus illustrates 
contested notions of corrupt behaviour. The attack on Pepys also shows the political motives 
behind campaigns against corruption: the libel published against him was part of the murky 
world of popish plot intrigue, with clear overtones of both catholic and sexual misdemeanour. 
Popery and lust were associated with corrupt behaviour. Pepys’s story was part of a larger 
one about long-term shifts in the nature of officeholding, state formation, the public interest, 
patronage and the culture of gift-giving that needs further exploration.  
Keywords: Samuel Pepys; corruption; bribes; public interest; private interest; state 
formation; gift-giving; patronage; navy; restoration; popery; lust 
 
1 
Corruption is a theme which runs across David Hayton’s work. His contributions to The 
History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1690–1715, and especially his survey of 
‘constituencies and elections’, frequently highlight the corrupt practices deployed at later 
Stuart polls.1 His Past & Present article on moral reform and country politics was even more 
concerned with the issue of corruption. In it, he made the case for a correlation between 
Country and moral reforms: ‘Both legislative programmes were essentially crusades against 
corruption: on the one hand the corruption of moral standards in society, on the other the 
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corruption of political institutions.’ Moreover, David offered an explanation for the neglect of 
this link: ‘Over-emphasis on the influence of the classical republican tradition has obscured 
the fact that most M.P.s, many of them relatively unsophisticated country squires, seem to 
have understood the concept of corruption – and indeed diagnosed all major disorders in the 
body politic – in narrow, simplistic terms, as failures of personal morality.’2 Although this 
article does not see issues of personal morality as either narrow or simplistic, it does seek to 
build on this central insight about the broad definition of corruption by examining different 
conceptions of corruption in the later Stuart period. It uses a case study of Samuel Pepys in 
order to point to important ambiguities in how contemporaries defined corrupt behaviour, as 
well as how they defended, exposed and attacked it. This article is also a foretaste of a longer 
project, since I plan to address such questions in a more systematic way and over a much 
longer time frame, in a study of pre-modern corruption, from reformation to reform. At the 
moment we lack such an overview. Although we have many excellent case studies of 
particular moments or scandals or types of corruption, there has not yet been a systematic 
attempt to synthesise such material and make the links across it.3 
Because we have both the private Pepys of the diary and the public record of Pepys as 
controversial naval administrator, we are able to recover, to a degree that is often difficult to 
achieve with other subjects of scandal, both a private and public perspective on corruption. 
Pepys’s simultaneous condemnation of corrupt behaviour in others and his justification or 
legitimisation of his own corrupt behaviour sheds interesting light on how corruption was 
defined and in particular, on the uncertain boundaries between presents or gifts and bribery, 
and the similarly blurred boundaries of public and private interests. Pepys developed 
interesting ideas about the need to provide private incentives in order to maximise efficiency 
that was in the king’s interest and hence to develop a notion that private and public interests 
could be made to coincide. The public revelation of his profiteering also highlights the role of 
print in exposing and defining corrupt behaviour and the ways in which the charge of 
corruption was used as a political weapon against rivals and enemies. Moreover, Pepys’s 
sexual indiscretions also highlight, as David Hayton sought to do, the link between sexual 
immorality and other forms of immoral conduct in office, and hence the extent to which 
personal failings were necessarily related to public ones. Finally, Pepys raises the issue of 
whether attention paid to corrupt individuals might mask more systematic corruption and how 
far Pepys’s corrupt behaviour was symptomatic of a climate of corruption induced by the 
growing reaches of the state and its capacity to raise money. 
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Historians have generally been kind to Samuel Pepys, who, because of the 
extraordinary richness of his diary, has generally been hailed as something of a lovable rogue, 
whose foibles humanise him and can be forgiven because of his tireless work to reform the 
navy. Pepys has a reputation as reformer, not someone who himself needed reform. Arthur 
Bryant’s subtitle of the third volume of his biographical trilogy, ‘The Saviour of the Navy’, is 
a view accepted by his most recent biographer, Claire Tomalin: ‘Pepys is regarded as one of 
the most important naval administrators in England’s history’.4 Latham and Matthews, 
despite having outlined the ways in which he profited, nevertheless suggest, apparently 
without irony, that Pepys ‘mastered the useful art of receiving gifts without becoming 
corrupt’.5 Amidst the admiration there have, nevertheless, been some more discordant voices. 
Henry Roseveare’s short entry on Pepys’s finances in the Companion to Latham and 
Matthew’s edition of the diary concludes that Pepys’s income was composed of ‘fees, 
perquisites, gratuities and downright bribes’.6 But it is really only the American legal scholar, 
John Noonan, in his massive survey of bribery from ancient Egypt to the modern day, who 
has considered Pepys’s corruption in any depth. Noonan devotes a chapter to showing how 
Pepys’s diary, ‘rich as it is in many other aspects, is also the confession of a grafter’.7 Noonan 
expertly highlights some of the ‘complexity’ of Pepys’s consciousness about his actions. This 
will be explored further here and linked to some greater contextual discussion than Noonan 
was able to achieve in a work that covers 4,000 years.  
As Noonan points out: ‘the man who began his career as a clerk in 1660 with 25 
pounds liquid capital … became a man possessing over 7000 pounds by the end of 1667’, an 
increase of almost 30,000%.8 Since his official salary was £350, this wealth could only have 
come from unofficial sources. Pepys’s diary reveals that he secured a number of payments, 
gifts and favours as a result of the office he held: animals, clothing, food, furniture, 
silverware, cash and sex. The money came from suppliers to the navy who wished to secure a 
contract; those who wished to secure a post; and those for whom Pepys could get bills paid or 
accounts settled. Pepys had a particularly close relationship with Sir William Warren, who 
supplied the navy with masts and used bribes to sweeten his deals: he sent Pepys gloves and a 
‘fair State-dish of Silver and cup with my armes ready-cut upon them’;9 and then another pair 
of gloves ‘wrapped up in paper’ so that the ‘40 pieces in good gold’ was not visible.10 In 
September 1664, Warren brought Pepys £100 ‘in a bag’, secretly handed over in a tavern 
when the two men were alone.11 Pepys records how he made even more out of the Tangier 
victuallers. About the time when Warren handed him the bag of money, Pepys also received 
£105 from a group of merchants tendering for the contract; and the money kept flowing from 
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that deal ‘for my particular share of the profits’.12 Pepys’s own testimony thus shows the 
extent of his corruption. It also chronicles Pepys’s sense of sheer excitement at receiving 
these bribes. When the 40 pieces of gold fell out of the gloves, Pepys records, it ‘did so cheer 
my heart that I could eat no victuals almost for dinner for joy’.13 When he received a gift of 
two flagons ‘with a merry heart, I looked up on them’ and they made ‘a fine sight and better 
than ever I did hope to see of my own’.14 Similarly he was ‘not a little proud’ when he rode ‘a 
very pretty Mare’ he had been given.15 
The diary is thus useful for revealing what was normally kept hidden: the routine 
ways in which an official salary could be enlarged. But it is even more useful for showing 
Pepys’s contradictory and ambiguous attitude to bribery and corruption. A paradox stands 
out: Pepys seemed to have a very clear idea of what corruption was, but increasingly 
justified, even to himself, the money he was making on the side. This paradox, not unique to 
Pepys, is worth exploring further. 
At precisely the time when he was receiving his bribes, Pepys wrote entries about 
‘abuses’ in the navy office and used the word ‘corruption’ to describe them.16 Thus he was 
deeply aware of what he called ‘Sir W[illiam] Batten’s corruption and underhand dealing’;17 
and noted in a condemnatory manner: ‘that hardly anybody goes to sea or hath anything done 
by Sir W Batten but it comes with a bribe’.18 Indeed, he perceived that ‘the corruptions of the 
Navy are of so many kinds that it is endless to look after them – especially while such a one 
as Sir W Batten discourages every man that is honest’.19 In 1668, MP Matthew Wren talked 
to Pepys ‘of the corruption of the Court, and how unfit it is for ingenious men, and himself 
particularly, to live in it, where a man cannot live but he must spend, and cannot get suitably, 
without breach of his honour’.20 Pepys also seemed shocked by Richard Cooling, the earl of 
Arlington’s secretary, who boasted that ‘his horse was a bribe, and his boots a bribe and told 
us he was made up of bribes and that he makes every sort of tradesman to bribe him; and 
invited me home to his house to taste of his bribe-wine. I never heard so much vanity from a 
man in my life.’21 Pepys also thought it ‘a very odd thing’ that his patron, the earl of 
Sandwich, profited from the Tangier contract to the tune of £1,500.22 Pepys certainly had a 
concept of corrupt behaviour and condemned it where he found it. 
Moreover, Pepys records his own uneasiness about accepting bribes and the lengths 
he went to keep them hidden for fear of how he might be made to answer for them. In 1663, 
on receiving one of his first bribes, he did not open the package in which the money was 
contained until he returned home: ‘and there I broke it open, not looking into it till all the 
money was out, that I might say I saw no money in the paper if ever I should be questioned 
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about it’.23 Pepys was sensitive to the possibility of being questioned about corrupt activity 
and took careful precautions to avoid being ensnared. He was, thus, annoyed when his wife 
acknowledged receipt of a ‘neat silver watch’ from a potential client, presumably since it 
meant that witnesses could be questioned; no wonder that Pepys resolved ‘to do the man a 
kindnesse’.24 Even his own diary entries were part of his attempt to cover his tracks. He 
carefully recorded that although he accepted 50 pieces of gold from Warren in 1667: ‘I never 
did to this day demand any thing of him’, and refused the money twice before finally 
accepting it; Warren promised him more if Pepys would get his bills paid, prompting Pepys 
to declare that he would ‘do my utmost for nothing to do him that justice’ – but all this was 
for show: Pepys confessed that he wrote in his diary ‘at large for my justification if anything 
of this should be hereafter enquired after’.25  
This fear of discovery was not fanciful and his awareness of corruption was no doubt 
heightened by several parliamentary investigations and prosecutions. In 1663, an attempt was 
made to impeach Charles II’s chief minister, the earl of Clarendon, on charges of having been 
‘bribed’ to make a disadvantageous peace with the Dutch.26 In 1666, Pepys was put ‘into a 
great pain’ by a ‘wild motion made in the House of Lords by the Duke of Buckingham for all 
men that had cheated the King to be declared traitors and felons, and that my Lord Sandwich 
was named’.27 And, in 1668, Pepys even had to justify his own actions to the commissioners 
of accounts, prompting him to ‘prepare’ those summoned to be interrogated ‘about what 
presents I had from them, that they may not publish them’.28 Pepys and his colleagues were 
accused of having ‘corruptly preferred and postponed payments’ and he resolved ‘to declare 
plainly, and, once for all, the truth of the whole, and what my profit hath been’.29 In the 
winter of 1669–70, Pepys was, again, called to account, this time to the Brook House 
Commissioners, and responded by protesting that he never did ‘directly or indirectly … 
demand or express any expectation of fee, gratuity or reward from any person for any 
service’ and deliberately underestimated the amount he was now worth by £6,000.30 Pepys’s 
diary shows that he understood what a bribe was, expressed his shock at the bribes taken by 
others, was uneasy that his own conduct might be discovered and sought to cover his tracks 
through outright denials of culpability. 
Yet, despite these clear signs that he knew what constituted corrupt behaviour and the 
risks involved in being caught, Pepys increasingly justified, even to himself, the money he 
was making on the side. He had a number of strategies for doing this. One was to think of, 
and describe, the bribes as gifts, presents, compliments, acknowledgements, kindnesses and 
loans. Thus Pepys refers to ‘a very noble present’ and, a year later, ‘a good present’ given to 
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him.31 The language of presents was mirrored by one of ‘kindnesses’ being properly 
recognized, or ‘obligations’ being requited.32 This was the language of friendship. Talking 
with Warren about a mutually-beneficial contract, Pepys noted that he had ‘a prospect of just 
advantage by his friendship’.33 Indeed, Pepys described Warren as ‘the best friend I have ever 
had in this office’.34 By deploying such terms, Pepys could accommodate his actions within 
ambiguous, but accepted, notions of how friends behaved to one another. Even the anglican 
divine, Jeremy Taylor’s popular advice about friendship, first published in 1657 and reprinted 
three times before 1671, urged that one friend was not to refuse the ‘kindnesses’ of another 
nor despise ‘the impropriety of them … . A gift (saith Solomon) fastneth friendships … so 
must the love of friends sometimes be refreshed with material and low Caresses; lest by 
striving to be too divine it becomes less humane: It must be allowed its share of both.’35 Even 
when he does not use the language of friendship, Pepys carefully distinguished between a 
bribe and a civil acknowledgement for services rendered. Thus, when being offered £200 for 
help in securing a patent, he declared: ‘that as I would not by anything be bribed to be unjust 
in my proceedings, so I was not so squeamish as not to take people’s acknowledgement 
where I have the good fortune by my pains to do them good and just offices’.36 This lack of 
squeamishness diminished further over time. 
As the last quotation suggests, reward for ‘good and just offices’ for others became a 
way of legitimising self-interest, especially if the greater good was that of the king as well as 
of the client. Thus, although Pepys accepted money from one contractor, he noted that: ‘there 
is not the least word or deed I have yet been guilty of in his behalf but what I am sure hath 
been to the King’s advantage and profit of the service, nor ever will I’.37 Pepys insisted that 
the king’s interest always came above his own and, indeed, that the public good was actually 
being furthered through the sweetened deals he struck. Thus, when Warren came to repay a 
‘kindness’, Pepys notes that: ‘I must also remember [it] was a service to the King.’38 When he 
was offered a bribe to go against the public interest, he contemplated returning it: ‘I 
[SHOULD THERE BE ‘went’ IN HERE? No there isn’t – it was Pepys’s rather truncated 
way of writing, but we could insert [went] if you think it makes the sense clearer ] to the 
office and there had a difference with Sir W. Batten about Mr. Bowyer’s tarr, which I am 
resolved to cross, though he sent me last night, as a bribe, a barrel of sturgeon, which, it may 
be, I shall send back, for I will not have the King abused so abominably in the price of what 
we buy, by Sir W. Batten’s corruption and underhand dealing.’39  
Moreover, Pepys argues, his actions always fell within the law. When negotiating a 
share of the profits from one contract, he calls this ‘lawfull profit’.40 Even when faced with 
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parliamentary scrutiny of the £500 ‘profit’ he had made on prize goods, he still thought that: 
‘there is nothing of crime can be laid to my charge’.41 The ‘lawful’ nature of such bribes 
derived in no small measure from their customary nature and ubiquity, in turn a reflection of 
the low pay of many state offices. Right at the start of his career Pepys’s patron, Sandwich, 
had told him: ‘that it was not the salary of any place that did make a man rich, but the 
opportunities of getting money while he is in the place’;42 and Sir William Warren told Pepys 
that ‘everybody must live by their places’.43 The system in which Pepys found himself 
operating was, thus, built around a tacit acceptance that an office was a means to an end as 
well as an end in itself. And it was a system in which others lacked the knowledge to expose 
abuse of office or even to fully understand how the system could be abused. In 1663, Pepys 
drew up a contract for £3,000 worth of masts and noted: ‘good God, to see what a man might 
do were I a knave – the whole business, from beginning to the end, being done by me out of 
the office’.44 
The strategies adopted in the diary to legitimise his bribe-taking were the same as 
those that Pepys used in public when cornered. He made an appeal to a notion of bribes as 
voluntary gifts, fair rewards for services rendered, of always working in the king’s and the 
public’s interest when, in 1670, Pepys explicitly and publicly denied the bribes that his own 
diary reveals that he took. He affirmed his ‘digilence’ and ‘integrity to my master and fair 
dealing towards those whom his service hath led me to have to do with’. Indeed, he protested: 
‘from the first hour of my serving his Majesty in this employment I did never to this day 
directly or indirectly demand or express any expectation of fee, gratuity or reward from any 
person for any service therein by me done or to be done them ... no gratuity, though 
voluntarily offered, hath ever met with my acceptance where I found not the affair to which it 
did relate accompanied with the doing right or advantage to his Majesty’. He had been so 
solicitous of the public interest that he ‘f[ou]nd not my estate at this day bettered by one 
thousand pounds’ since his admission to office. He was ready ‘to justify the same not only by 
oath but by a double retribution of every penny or pennyworth of advantage I shall be found 
to have received’. Pepys thus pleaded that he placed public over private interest: ‘no 
concernments relating to my private fortune, pleasure or health did at any time (even under 
the terror of the Plague itself) divide me one day and night from my attendance on the 
business of the place’, which had cost him his good eyesight.45 
In his earlier speech to MPs, Pepys had also defended what seemed corrupt by 
pleading necessity, utility, custom and humanity. The system of paying sailors by tickets was 
both useful and necessary, he explained, when there was ‘not ready money’ to pay them; ‘nor 
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can that be called irregular that never was regular’; and although he admitted that the practice 
‘may be extremely abused if not well looked to’, he argued that the ‘irregularity’ in the order 
in which sailors were paid was due to the ‘discretion’ exercised in the sailors’ favour: the 
navy office was ‘not to be condemned if the pitiful necessity of some have been relieved 
before others out of the strict order’. Pepys denied ‘any indirect or partial paying by tickets, 
but only where mere necessity did compel them’.46 Administrative irregularity was thus 
inevitable because of the irregularity of government finance to pay sailors and was actually in 
the sailors’ interest.  
Moreover, Pepys was convinced that incentives of private profit improved the public 
service. In 1666, he wrote a paper for Sir William Coventry about victualling, in which he set 
down the maxim that ‘my work is likeliest to be best done by him whose profit is increased 
by the well doing of it without increase of charge to me that employs him’.47 Greasing the 
machine, he claimed, actually improved its efficiency: pursers would have an incentive to 
keep their ships at sea for longer if by doing so they stood to gain, and this, in turn, would 
give them ‘a plain and unbeholden subsistence and thereby be delivered from the necessity of 
studying new and practising old artifices’.48 The conspiracies of embezzlement and fraud 
practised by pursers and commanders would, Pepys was convinced, stop. As things currently 
stood, he suggested, ‘it is not the purser’s corruption but necessity must be thought able to 
tempt him to such unthrifty ways of profit’49 – but change the system to increase the private 
profit and the public would be better served not least because the motives for corruption 
would be removed. This philosophy also seems to capture Pepys’s attitude to his own profits, 
which he consistently argued were not only compatible with, but actually furthered, the 
king’s interest. 
Pepys thus argued, both to himself and to those who questioned him, that the bribes 
he accepted were lawful, freely-given gifts, that either justly rewarded his effort or furthered 
the king’s interest, and even made it more humane for those employed at the sharp end. If 
Pepys’s defence was right, then corruption could, at worst, be the inevitable outcome of not 
paying state officials adequately, or, at best, actually beneficial to the state. The trouble with 
this interpretation is, first, that Pepys had to lie to legitimise his behaviour and, second, that a 
very different construction could be, and was, put on Pepys’s actions by his critics. Far from 
working in the public interest, Pepys was accused of pursuing his private interest; instead of 
‘friendship’, Pepys was depicted as abusing social relationships for profit; and where Pepys 
saw self-restraint and legality, others saw rapaciousness and illegality. The ambiguity 
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inherent in Pepys’s own views about corruption show that different and clashing definitions 
of corruption also existed in the public sphere. 
2 
Pepys was the subject, in 1679, of a parliamentary enquiry that landed him in the Tower and 
of a vitriolic pamphlet. Both are instructive about public attitudes to corruption.  
That Pepys became a victim of the Popish Plot is well known.50 One of the witnesses, 
William Bedloe, alleged that Samuel Atkins, one of Pepys’s servants, was present at the 
murder of Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey, whose death in suspicious circumstances triggered the 
anti-popish alarm.51  Pepys may have been the intended target of the accusation, saved by the 
fact that he had a cast-iron alibi, since he was away from London on the night in question. 
Nevertheless, pressure on Pepys persisted. A parliamentary enquiry investigating the 
‘miscarriages of the navy’ heard information, orchestrated by the colourful intriguer, Colonel 
Scott, that Pepys was a traitor and popishly inclined.52  The evidence against Pepys was 
provided by his former butler, John James, who harboured a grudge after his dismissal for 
having been caught in bed with his master’s housekeeper.53 James told MPs that the Pepys 
household included a ‘jesuit’, the Portuguese musician, Morelli, who participated in catholic 
masses in Somerset House; that the two men sang psalms together; and that Pepys 
commended catholics ‘for their constancy in Religion’.54 Pepys was ordered to be arrested, 
despite his vehement protest that he was ‘as good a son of the Church of England as any man’ 
and hence ‘so far from suspicion of Popery’.55 As Sir Francis Rolle sarcastically noted, Pepys 
‘has been very unfortunate in his Servants; one accused to be in the Plot (Atkins his 
Secretary!) another, his best maid, found in bed with his Butler! another accused to be a 
Jesuit! very unfortunate!’56 
The chair of the parliamentary enquiry, Sir William Harbord, also noted that this was 
not the first time that Pepys’s protestantism had been questioned. In 1673, Pepys became MP 
for Castle Rising, one of the notoriously corrupt pocket boroughs that had only about 30 
voters (amongst whom Pepys spent over £600) and where, during the Restoration, the 
catholic, Henry Howard, had a strong influence because the family held the lordship of the 
manor.57 Indeed, a letter of recommendation from Howard was the subject of a complaint to 
the Commons and, in February 1674, during the subsequent investigation, Pepys’s religion 
became the focus of parliamentary attention. Rumours that he had an altar and a crucifix in 
his house, and even that he had said protestantism ‘came out of Henry the eighth's codpiece’, 
were repeated in the Commons, forcing him to give a speech defending himself ‘as a good 
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Protestant and a good Churchman, and the best sort of Protestant’.58 He declared that he had 
assiduously attended church; taken communion; qualified himself according to the Test Act; 
and had ensured that there were no catholic chaplains on any navy ship. He protested that he 
‘had not been once in his life at Mass’, a lie according to the testimony of his own diary 
where, on 19 May 1661, he records hearing not one but two masses at York House, the 
Spanish ambassador’s residence, and that was clearly not the first occasion he had done so, 
nor the last.59 The affair finally blew over when the charges against him could not be fully 
substantiated, but clearly suspicions lingered.60 
Popery played a significant role in early modern ideas about corruption. Anti-popery 
drew a good deal of its force in the 16th and earlier 17th centuries from an association 
between the corruption of the true word of God and the corruption of money. That correlation 
was repeated in the accusations made against Pepys. In parliament, the catholic duke of 
York’s control of the navy translated into fiscal mismanagement. As Sir Francis Winnington 
put it, £600,000 had been granted for the building of ships and Pepys had told MPs that ‘they 
would be built in a year’; but ‘there was 600,000l. gone, for they got the money and 
prorogued the Parliament’.61 This was symptomatic of a more general alliance between fiscal 
corruption and the favouring of popery. Lord Treasurer Danby, Winnington said, had 
‘exhausted the Treasure of the Crown, by acquiring a great estate to himself, &c. and 
endeavoured to stifle the discovery of the Plot, when it was just coming to light’. Danby and 
popery rose together. Also Danby had systematically attempted to use state money to bribe 
MPs to become supporters of the Court.62 Two days after Pepys was interrogated in 
parliament about his religion, MPs investigated the abuse of secret service money which had 
been paid to 27 of their colleagues.63 An intrinsic part of ‘popery and arbitrary government’ 
was, thus, the misspending of state resources to subvert parliament.  
The association of popery and corruption was also made in a two-part pamphlet, A 
Hue and Cry after P and H., which had Plain Truth, or a Private Discourse between P. and 
H. appended to it.64 The tract satirised Pepys and his friend, Will Hewer, accusing both of 
favouring catholics ‘so far as to promote them to be Captains, or Lieutenants, or Mid-Ship-
Men extraordinary’ and ridiculed Pepys for his ostentatiously-painted coach, imagining that it 
was decorated with ‘your Jesuite M[orelli] Playing upon his Lute, and Singing a Holy 
Song’.65 The tract’s charge of popery followed immediately on from a damning indictment of 
the two men’s corrupt behaviour, demanding that they:  
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refund all the money they have unjustly taken for Permissions & Protections, to their 
Merchants or Owners of all such Ships as were fitted out for the last Imbargo. And 
also give satisfaction for your extraordinary Gain made to your selves in buying of 
Timber, for Building the New Ships of war. P & H you must also Refund those 
before-hand Guinies or Broadpieces; and also the Jars of Oyl, and Boxes of Chocolett 
and Chests of Greek Wines, and Chests of Syracusa Wines, and Pots of Anchovies 
and Quarter-Casks of old Malago, and Butts of Sherry & Westphalia hams & Bolonia 
Sauceges & Barrels of Pickel’d Oysters and Jars of Ollives, and Jars of Tent, & 
Parmosant Cheeses, & Chests of Florence Wine and Boxes of Orange Flower Water; 
And all those dry’d Cods and Lings, and Hogsheads of Claret, White-Wines, 
Champaynes, and Dozens of Syder: And also all those Mocos, Parrotts and Parakeets, 
Virginia Nightingales and Turtledoves, and those Fatt Turkeys and Pigs, and all those 
Turkish Sheep, Barberry Horses, and Lyons, Tygers, and Beares; and all those fine 
Spanish Matts. All which were received from Sea-Captains, Consuls, Lieutenants, 
Masters, Boatswains, Gunners, Carpenters and Pursers; or from their Wives or Sons 
or Daughters; Or from Some of the Officers in the Dock Yards; as Master Ship-
Wrights, Master of Attendance, or Clerk of the Cheques, and Storekeeprs &c And 
more especially those great Lumps taken of Sir D G Victualler.66  
This rich, almost lyrical, passage, cataloguing the sumptuous goods becoming available 
during the Restoration, publicly exposed the bribes and inducements privately recorded in the 
diary.  
Indeed, the tract played on the public unveiling of the private. It thus promised ‘plain 
truth’ by publishing an allegedly ‘private discourse’ between Pepys and Hewer, using the 
dialogue format to reveal their secret calculations about moneymaking. The pamphlet makes 
an extended play on how Hewer and Pepys had sought to keep their corruption away from the 
public gaze. Hewer reveals that he would only bring commissions to be signed for which he 
already had received money, ironically so that ‘it is impossible, that ever [Pepys] should be 
brought in question’ for them and Hewer promised to keep both men ‘clear enough, let the 
World pry never so close into our business’ – yet the tract itself publicly catalogues and 
exposes that hidden corruption.67 Similarly, the two men discuss extorting money for 
promotions within the navy service, which Pepys declares is ‘very discreetly done, and it is 
impossible that ever it shou’d be discover’d so’, yet the tract does very clearly ‘discover’ 
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their corruption.68 The two men had come ‘within the Reach of the Printing Press’ which, the 
tract declares, ‘squeezes you both very hard, with Matter of Truth’.69  
The tract thus puts forward a very different view of the ‘friendly favours’ and lawful 
‘gratifications’ referred to in the diary, and of the notion that a culture of venality in office 
justified rapacity in all. Pepys and Hewer are depicted as conspiring how best to rake off 
money from the preparations for war against France: ‘we ought to think of getting as much as 
we can, in our Imploys, as well others in the like have done … And what will the World say, 
if we do not? That we are all Fools.’ But the justification that they were simply doing what 
everyone else did was here delegitimised, for their corrupt behaviour is shown as a cruel 
twisting of proper social relationships and far from victimless: the men had committed a 
‘great Robbery’ by extorting money from cripples and maimed sailors who had been 
‘squeazed so cruelly’ and ‘forc’d to stand a whole day in Snow and Rain, in the Corners of 
the Streets, and beg for it’.70 Moreover, the discrepancy between Pepys’s public persona and 
his private corruption exposed him to be a hypocrite: the mock painting described in the tract 
as embellishing Pepys’s ostentatious carriage showed cripples receiving ‘his Charity’ which 
was, in reality, never given.  
The pamphlet further publicly exposed Pepys and Hewer’s private corruption and 
their victims through allegations that they used their office to abuse women.71 Pepys and 
Hewer were said to have extorted gifts and money from ‘wives’ and ‘daughters’ as well as 
their menfolk. And the tract ended with a mock ‘hue and cry’ (significantly in a larger font) 
referring to ‘a Lady in Lincolns-Inn-Fields, or to a Lady at her Country House in Chelsey; or 
to another at her House near the Exchequer; or to two Merchants Daughters in London; they 
being well known to these Two Persons; especially P[epys]’.72 These women may well be 
more of those wronged by extortions of money along the lines of the abused woman 
discussed in the tract’s previous paragraph;73 but there is also a clear hint of sexual 
impropriety. Pepys’s long-time but unmarried companion, Mary Skinner, who was ‘well 
known’ to Pepys in more senses than one, was the daughter of a merchant and may well be 
one of the women being referred to.74 The diary, of course, provides evidence that Pepys did 
seek sex by advancing husbands to better positions in the navy. Pepys received and, indeed, 
aggressively pursued sexual favours in return for his patronage. The diary records, for 
example, how he deliberately sought out the ‘pretty’ and ‘virtuous modest’ wife of a 
carpenter, Bagwell. Initially he resolved to help the man without offering any ‘courtship’ to 
her (she is never given a first name in the diary), but he found that impossible: he began first 
with caresses and found ‘her every day more and more coming with good words and 
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promises of getting her husband a place’. Then, having dined at Bagwell’s home, ‘je tentais a 
faire ce que je voudrais et contre sa force je le faisais biens que passe a mon contentment’. 
Pepys kept his side of the bargain and furthered Bagwell’s career; as a further reward ‘en fin 
j’avais ma volont d’elle’.75  
The printed insinuations about Pepys’s behaviour towards women could have been 
the response to allegations made by him about the immorality of his former butler, John 
James. James and Pepys were trying to smear each other’s reputation and creditworthiness.76 
It is significant that Pepys tried to counter the corruption charges against him by claiming that 
James had himself received money to lay false charges and to write the printed tract.77 We 
can discover a good deal about the tract’s genesis as a result of Pepys’s characteristically-
methodical attempt to get to the bottom of the affair. James had been prompted to write the 
mock dialogue by Colonel Roderick Mansell (himself the intended victim of the Meal Tub 
Plot, which was to have planted incriminating evidence of a presbyterian plot) and received 
payment for it.78 As James explained, Mansell wanted to publish another piece ‘drawne by 
way of Narrative of Proceedings betweene me and Mr Pepys & the usages I had from him’ 
but James had refused to let it be printed. So the Hue and Cry section of the published tract 
was written (depending on which version of the story Pepys chose to believe) either by 
Mansell or by ‘Narrative’ Smith or by Felix Donlius (also known as Lewes).79  
Such details are important because they suggest larger political motives behind the 
accusations of corruption against Pepys. According to Alex Harris, a messenger of the 
admiralty who had temporarily fallen out with Pepys (he suspected the latter of blocking 
payments to him), Colonel Mansell was ‘ye Principll Enemy of Mr Pepys, a Person very 
intimate with and employ’d by ye Earle of Shaftesbury and ye greatest Stickler in the 
carrying on of this Business’.80 As the duke of York’s creature, Pepys was damned by 
association and so naturally became a target for those in the house of commons seeking to 
attack James, who included Sir William Harbord and Shaftesbury.81 Moreover, although the 
earl’s biographer largely discounts allegations that Shaftesbury had himself accepted bribes,82 
it seems likely that Pepys knew that he did: his diary records him admiring ‘how prettily this 
cunning Lord can be partial and dissemble it in this case, being privy to the bribe he is to 
receive’.83 The two men, it seems, had both been accepting backhanders from the same man, 
but neither let on. Whether Shaftesbury feared that Pepys had proof against him or, more 
probably, disliked Pepys because of his closeness to the duke of York, it is no surprise to find 
Shaftesbury deliberately smearing Pepys over the allegations of popery in 1674 (he was the 
named source of the rumours against Pepys) or that Pepys was convinced that Shaftesbury 
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was behind much of the attack in 1679. Allegations of corruption, therefore, were intensely 
political. 
3 
 
What, then, does a case study of Pepys tell us about the culture of corruption in the later 
Stuart period or about pre-modern corruption more generally? 
One important theme is the ambiguity, capaciousness and contested nature of the 
definition of corruption.84 Pepys could at once both condemn others for corruption and 
engage in it himself by redefining what was corrupt, so that the bribes he took became, for 
him at least, lawful rewards or friendly gifts for favours and exertion, and were never done at 
the expense of the crown’s interests. Indeed, he could even construct a case in which 
irregularities had virtue, usefully and humanely meeting the necessities of a system that was 
otherwise incapable of ensuring regular payments to sailors. Pepys constructed a notion of 
himself as a man of integrity and even that his rise in fortunes was a reflection of God’s 
providence.85 Yet the public attacks on Pepys constructed a very different picture which 
turned Pepys’s defence on its head: accepting bribes was rapacious and wrong, and it did 
harm because it preyed on those, including the vulnerable and weak, who needed his help.86 
In this reading, Pepys deserved a ‘hue and cry’ after him. 
Pepys, thus, helps us to construct two concurrent, but rival, interpretations of 
officeholding. One recognized offices as poorly paid, administering an emerging ‘fiscal-
military state’ that was full of inefficiency and which, therefore, needed the enterprise of men 
who could deliver core services and make them more efficient even if that meant 
incentivising them through deals that promoted their private interest.87 This interpretation of 
office saw gifts and rewards as voluntary marks of friendship or lawful and just 
acknowledgements of services not only rendered but done with special speed, care or 
assistance. And it recognized that such gifts were everyday practice, without which an 
officeholder would remain relatively poor, and that they could be beneficial to the state: 
private profit yielded public benefit. The alternative construction stressed vice rather than 
virtue, viewing such behaviour as immoral and illegitimate, hypocritical and full of pride and 
greed; the acceptance of bribes signified a lack of justice, integrity and honesty. Such 
corruption involved a comprehensive immorality that encompassed religious belief, sexual 
behaviour and a wide range of vices.88 This second construction also stressed the need to 
expose what remained hidden and secretive; and for friendship to be based on more than 
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mutual self-gratification. Finally, it depicted the scheming intelligence of the officeholder as 
very far from being harnessed to the interests of the public or even the state: private profit 
was self-serving vice. 
A number of things flow from this duality. First, corruption lay in the eye of the 
beholder and was something that others did rather than oneself; but, because the allegation 
was an emotive one that impugned public spiritedness, it could also be used as part of a 
political game to delegitimise an opponent or rival. The accusation of corruption was often 
one intrinsically about hypocrisy: a private vice masquerading as a public benefit needed to 
be exposed and punished. Second, corruption explored the boundaries of friendship, and the 
relationship between patron and client. Pepys used the language of friendship for the man 
who offered him most bribes, Sir William Warren, and the friendship between Pepys and 
Hewer was symbolised in the printed dialogue between them when they pause to ‘hugg and 
kiss one another’;89 but these could be characterised as self-interested friendships in which 
legitimate gift-giving or service between friends was abused. We need to know much more 
about such uncertain boundaries, how contemporaries sought to negotiate them, how they 
were viewed and how they changed over time.90 Aaron Graham has recently argued that such 
informal networks, rather than an emerging bureaucracy, were intrinsic to the emergence of 
the fiscal-military state because they supplied the necessary trust needed to raise capital and 
because they were the more effective in delivering services. ‘Corruption’, if it merits that 
term, might thus have been a price worth paying.91 But whilst it is true that credit was built on 
personal networks, we also need to factor public perceptions of exploitative corrupt 
behaviour into this calculation and the significant cost of lost trust in the structures of 
politics.92 
Such public mistrust was not new. In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, as Linda 
Levy Peck has shown, an increasing anxiety about corruption pervaded the political and 
literary discourse and the cause was, in part, structural: ‘Early Stuart England was governed 
by a personal monarchy which ruled through a patrimonial bureaucracy organised within a 
hierarchical society structured by patron-client relationships.’93 Such relationships were often 
monetarised. One text, written in the 16th century but translated and published during the 
time Pepys was writing his diary, argued for a deeply-instrumental view of the patron-client 
relationship. Giovanni della Casa’s The arts of grandeur and submission, or, A discourse 
concerning the behaviour of great men towards their inferiours, and of inferiour personages 
towards men of greater quality (1665) claimed that clients approached patrons ‘principally, 
or only’ from motives of ‘either profit, or pleasure’ not from ‘True and Ideated Friendship’ of 
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virtuous persons.94 Since ‘Riches and Power’ were the principal motives for the relationship, 
virtues that might be prized elsewhere were out of place: ‘that modesty which becomes a 
Virgin in a Cloyster, is criminall in a Curtesan’.95 ‘Utility’ was thus the proper bond: 
Thus it is manifest, that in these kindes of associations, such onely are comprehended 
as are different in power and riches: and the bonds of them are not a particular 
affection and love each have for others, but utility. From whence also it is concluded 
(which was before asserted) that they are much mistaken, who think that this sort of 
friendship hath any affinity with, or ought to be managed according to the principles 
of true and exact friendship.96 
Clients should not ‘perplexe themselves with scruples out of Divinity, Morallity, or 
Politicks’.97 Thus, although Della Casa believed that a client ought not to be enslaved by his 
patron, for the latter ‘The world is but a great market, in which every thing is sold’.98 The 
publication of such works in the early Restoration, together with Pepys’s behaviour, suggests 
that such views were not uncommon. Gerald Aylmer suggested long ago that early modern 
officeholding was seen ‘as a private right or interest, rather than as a public service’. Aylmer 
even quotes a tract of 1702 which, significantly in light of the previous discussion, depicts a 
dialogue over naval mismanagement in which ‘Fudg’, an Admiralty official, deflects talk of 
private interest by referring to ‘the King’s interest’.99 Yet Aylmer also sensed that the 
pressure of war in the later Stuart period was putting significant pressure on what constituted 
private and public interests, a tension that was to play out for much of the 18th century.  
Charting the shift of attitudes to public and private interests, friendship, gift-giving 
and patronage requires a broad chronological treatment, stretching into the early 19th century, 
and an attempt to relate state formation to ideas and practices of officeholding.100 Such a 
survey would also need to examine the rise of ‘old corruption’ – the term given to the system 
of parasites who fed off the state through sinecures, pensions, rewards, government contracts 
and so on, and, in turn, filled parliament, as Pepys did, by buying corrupt boroughs or unduly 
influencing elections with money, bribes and lavish entertainments – as well as its decline. As 
the study of Pepys suggests, and as David Hayton’s work also urges, we might challenge the 
association of ‘old corruption’ with the long regime of Robert Walpole and ‘whig oligarchy’ 
after 1715.101 Such an interpretation obscures larger trends that pre-date Walpole’s 
premiership and ignores ways in which Walpole reflected, as well as caused, cultural shifts.  
 
17 
 
 
                                                          
1 The History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1690–1715, ed. E. Cruickshanks, S. 
Handley and D.W. Hayton (5 vols, Cambridge, 2002), i, 36–261. 
2 David Hayton, ‘Moral Reform and Country Politics in the Late Seventeenth-Century House 
of Commons’, Past & Present, No. 128 (1990), 48–91. 
3 Joel Hurstfield, Freedom, Corruption and Government in Elizabethan England (Harvard, 
1973); Linda Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England (1990); 
Pauline Croft, ‘Patronage and Corruption, Parliament and Liberty in Seventeenth-Century 
England’, Historical Journal, xxxvi (1993), 415–21; Alan Stewart, ‘Bribery, Buggery, and 
the Fall of Lord Chancellor Bacon’, in Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe, ed. 
Victoria Kahn and Lorna Hutson (New Haven, CT, 2001); Nieves Matthews, Francis Bacon: 
The History of a Character Assassination (New Haven, CT, 1996); David Hebb, ‘Profiting 
from Misfortune: Corruption and the Admiralty under the Early Stuarts’, in Politics, Religion 
and Popularity in Early Stuart England, ed. Tom Cogswell, Richard Cust and Peter Lake 
(Cambridge, 2002); John Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, NJ, 1971); John 
Pocock, Virtue, History and Commerce (Cambridge, 1985); Anna Clark, Scandal: The Sexual 
Politics of the British Constitution (Princeton, NJ, 2005); Howard Tomlinson, ‘Place and 
Profit: An Examination of the Ordnance Office, 1660–1714’, Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 5th ser., xxv (1975), 55–75; Faramerz Dabhoiwala, ‘Sex and the Societies 
for Moral Reform, 1688–1800’, Journal of British Studies, xlvi (2007), 290–319; Mark 
Knights, ‘Parliament, Print and Corruption in Later Stuart Britain’, Parliamentary History, 
xxvi (2007), 49–61; Wilfred Prest, ‘Judicial Corruption in Early Modern England’, Past & 
Present, No. 133 (1991), 67–95; Clayton Roberts, ‘Party and Patronage in Later Stuart 
England’, in England’s Rise to Greatness 1660–1763, ed. Stephen Baxter (Berkeley, CA, 
1983); Aaron Graham, ‘Partisan Politics and the British Fiscal-Military State, 1689–1713’, 
University of Oxford PhD, 2011; Thomas Horne, ‘Politics in a Corrupt Society: William 
Arnall's Defense of Robert Walpole’, Journal of the History of Ideas, xli (1980), 601–14; 
Carol Howard, ‘Wollstonecraft's Thoughts on Slavery and Corruption’, The Eighteenth 
Century, xlv (2004), 61–109; Isaac Kramnick, ‘Corruption in Eighteenth Century English and 
American Political Discourse’, in Virtue, Corruption and Self Interest: Political Values in the 
Eighteenth Century, ed. Richard K. Matthews (Bethlehem, PA, 1994); John Noonan, Bribes 
(New York, 1984); Nicholas Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of 
Imperial Britain (Boston, MA, 2006); Philip Stern, ‘Corporate Virtue: The Language of 
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Empire in Early Modern British Asia’, Renaissance Studies, xxvi (2012), 510–30; Andrew 
Fitzmaurice, 'American Corruption', in The Monarchical Republic of Early Modern England, 
ed. John F. McDiarmid (Farnham, 2007); Brian Smith, ‘Edmund Burke, The Warren 
Hastings Trial and the Moral Dimension of Corruption’, Polity, xl (2008), 70–94; Eckhart 
Hellmuth, ‘Why Does Corruption Matter? Reforms and Reform Movements in Britain and 
Germany in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 
c (1999), 5–24; Philip Lawson and John Phillips, ‘ “Our Execrable Banditti”: Perceptions of 
Nabobs in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain', Albion, xvi (1984), 225–41; Philip Harling, The 
Waning of ‘Old Corruption’: The Politics of Economical Reform in Britain, 1779–1846 
(Cambridge, 1996); Philip Harling, ‘Rethinking Old Corruption’, Past & Present, No. 147 
(1995), 127–58; William D. Rubinstein, ‘The End of “Old Corruption” in Britain 1780–
1860’, Past & Present, No. 101 (1983), 55–86; Gerald Aylmer, ‘From Office-Holding to 
Civil Service: The Genesis of Modern Bureaucracy’, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society, 5th ser., xxx (1980), 91–108; Corrupt Histories, ed. Emmanuel Kreike and William 
Chester Jordan (Rochester, NY, 2004). For a comparative analysis see Jean-Claude Waquet, 
Corruption: Ehtics and Power in Florence 1600–1770 (1984 translation);[WAS THIS 
PUBLISHED IN London, 1984? No, the original was in French in 1984, it was translated into 
English in 1991 by Linda McCall for Polity Press, published in Cambridge. I’ve also just 
noticed that Ethics has a typo in my title ] Patricia Bonomi, The Lord Cornbury Scandal: The 
Politics of Reputation in British America (1998). 
4 Arthur Bryant, Pepys: Saviour of the Navy (Cambridge, 1938); Claire Tomalin, Samuel 
Pepys. The Unequalled Self (2002), p. xxxvi. 
5 Robert Latham and William Matthews, The Diary of Samuel Pepys (10 vols, Berkeley, CA, 
1970–6), i, pp. cxxiii–iv. 
6 The Diary of Samuel Pepys, ed. Robert Latham and William Matthews (11 vols. 1970–83), 
x, 131, 133.  
7 Noonan, Bribes, 387. 
8 Noonan, Bribes, 385. 
9 I have used The Diary of Samuel Pepys MA, FRS, ed. Henry Wheatley (10 vols, 1893-9) 
[hereafter cited as Diary, with date of entry], since it is the basis for an online edition (at 
http://www.pepysdiary.com/) that is readily accessible. The text is reasonably reliable when 
compared with The Diary of Samuel Pepys, ed. Latham and Matthews, though the latter’s 
notes are superior. Diary, 2 Oct. 1663. 
19 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Diary, 2 Feb. 1664. 
11 Diary, 16 Sept. 1664. 
12 Diary, 4 Feb. 1667. 
13 Diary, 2 Feb. 1664. 
14 Diary, 21 July, 9 Sept. 1664. 
15 Diary, 5 Aug. 1664. 
16 The word ‘corruption’ had many meanings but its religious, moral and medical ones were 
supplemented, as here, by a notion of malpractice in office.  
17 Diary, 13 June 1664. 
18 Diary, 27 June 1663. On 15 Nov. 1665 he called him a ‘lazy, corrupt, doating rogue’. 
19 Diary, 17 June 1664; cf. 22 May 1664. 
20 Diary, 27 Sept. 1668. 
21 Diary, 30 July 1667. 
22 Diary, 27 Dec. 1667. 
23 Diary, 3 Apr. 1663. 
24 Diary, 17 Apr. 1665. 
25 Diary, 25 Nov. 1667. 
26 Diary, 10 July 1663. 
27 Diary, 5 Oct. 1666. 
28 Diary, 2 Mar. 1668. The examinations of 1668–70 are explored in C.S. Knighton, Pepys 
and the Navy (Stroud, 2003), ch. 5. 
29 Diary, 11 Feb. 1668. See also Anchitell Grey, Debates of the House of Commons (10 vols, 
1769), 15 Feb. 1668 [accessible online via British History Online, at http://www.british-
history.ac.uk].  
30 The Letters of Samuel Pepys: 1656–1703, ed. Guy De la Bédoyère (2006), 80–1: Pepys to 
the Brooke House commissioners, 6 Jan. 1670; Noonan, Bribes, 380. For a fuller defence of 
the accusations of corruption, see the journal Pepys made of his interactions with the Brooke 
House, published in Pepys’s Later Diaries, ed. C.S. Knighton (Stroud, 2004), 12–40. This 
records the moment when, having challenged the commissioners to produce a single ticket 
that showed a fraudulent payment to himself, they promptly did so. 
31 Diary, 10 Feb. 1663; 2 Mar. 1664. 
32 Diary, 12 Feb., 18 July 1664. 
33 Diary, 17 Oct. 1664. 
20 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
34 Diary, 5 Dec. 1664. 
35 Jeremy Taylor, A Discourse of the Nature, Offices, and Measures of Friendship with Rules 
of Conducting it (1657), 100–1. 
36 Diary, 12 Dec. 1663. 
37 Diary, 5 Jan. 1664. 
38 Diary, 25 Nov. 1667 – also noting that: ‘I never did to this day demand any thing of him’. 
39 Diary, 13 June 1663. 
40 Diary, 5 Mar. 1663. 
41 Diary, 3 Feb. 1668. 
42 Diary, 16 Aug. 1660 and he later learned that Lord Sandwich had received £1,500 on one 
contract (27 Dec. 1667). 
43 Diary, 2 Aug. 1664. 
44 Diary, 10 Sept. 1663. 
45 Letters of Samuel Pepys, ed. De la Bédoyère, 80–2.   
46 The Diary of John Milward, Esq. Member of Parliament for Derbyshire September, 1666 
to May 1668, ed. C. Robbins (1938), 207–9. 
47 The Further Correspondence of Samuel Pepys 1662–1679, ed. J.R. Tanner (1928), 93–111, 
quotation at 105.  
48 Further Correspondence of Samuel Pepys, ed. Tanner, 109. 
49 Further Correspondence of Samuel Pepys, ed. Tanner, 98. 
50 James Long and Ben Long, The Plot against Pepys: Detection and Intrigue in Seventeenth 
Century London (2007). 
51 For Atkins, see John H. Wilson, The Ordeal of Mr Pepys’s Clerk (Columbus, OH, 1972). 
52 On 25 Oct. 1668, his wife revealed that she was a catholic. 
53 Pepys told MPs that James had the ‘ill luck to fall into an amour with my house-keeper, 
and, as fortune was, Morello overheard their intrigues, and catched them together at an 
unseasonable time of the night. It was Sunday, three o'clock in the morning (the better day the 
better deed.) I turned him away, and he was never in my House since; but I had cause of 
suspicion that James came within my House at a window, and robbed me’: Grey, Debates, 20 
May 1679. 
54 Grey, Debates, 20 May 1679. For a fuller list of the accusations made by James see his 
testimony at Bodl., MS Rawlinson, A 173, ff. 178–9.  
55 Grey, Debates, 14 Apr. 1679. 
21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
56 Grey, Debates, 20 May 1679. 
57 The History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1660–1690, ed. B.D. Henning (3 vols, 
1983) [hereafter cited as HPC, 1660–90], i, 323–4. 
58 Grey, Debates, 10, 16 Feb. 1674. 
59 See also, Diary, 10 May 1663. 
60 For an excellent discussion of Pepys’s religious beliefs, see Kate Loveman, ‘Samuel Pepys 
and “Discourses touching Religion” under James II’, English Historical Review, cxxvii 
(2012), 46–82.  
61 Grey, Debates, 22 Mar. 1679. 
62 For Pepys’s support of this, see HPC, 1660–90, iii, 226: in the face of the discipline of 
opposition forces, ‘we must be sure to bribe voices enough’. 
63 Grey, Debates, 23 May 1679.  
64 The Early English Books Online copy has Plain Truth first, but it is paginated first at p. 5, 
with A Hue and Cry, paginated at pp. 1–4.  
65 A Hue and Cry, 3. 
66 A Hue and Cry, 1–2. The reference at the end is probably to Sir Denis Gauden, a navy 
victualler. I am grateful to Kate Loveman for spotting this. 
67 A Hue and Cry, 6. [GIVEN THE PAGINATION FOR Hue and Cry STATED IN NOTE 
64 ABOVE (pp. 1-4), IS THIS RIGHT OR SHOULD IT BE Plain Truth? IT SAID ibid 
HERE? This is an odd one because a single pamphlet has two title pages, one at p5. I have 
tended to call the whole pamphlet A Hue and Cry but I can see that that might be confusing 
unless perhaps note 64 explains that the pamphlet as a whole will be referred to as A Hue and 
Cry because of the continuous pagination?] 
68 A Hue and Cry, 7. [IS THIS RIGHT? See above  ]  
69 A Hue and Cry, 2. For print as a means of correcting victualling abuses see Knights, 
‘Parliament, Print and Corruption’. 
70 A Hue and Cry, 2, 7. [IS THIS RIGHT? See above ] 
71 A Hue and Cry, 3. 
72 A Hue and Cry, 4. Cf. C.S. Knighton’s observation ‘that he was never denounced for 
immorality by his political opponents’; ODNB (entry on Samuel Pepys).   
73 That paragraph refers to John Walbanke, clerk to the navy and another of Pepys’s friends: 
Bodl., MS Rawlinson, A 173. ff. 180–3: ms tract.  
22 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
74 Mary’s ‘steady friendship and Assistances’ for the last 33 years of Pepys’s life was 
rewarded in his will with a bequest of £200 per annum: James H. Hanford, ‘Pepys and the 
Skinner Family’, Review of English Studies, vii (1931), 257–70.  
75 Diary, 9, 17 July, 7 Aug. 1663; 31 May, 20 Oct., 20 Dec. 1664; 23 Jan., 20 Feb. 1665; 1 
July 1666; 1 Feb., 4 Mar. 1667. The passages translate as ‘I tried to do what I would with her 
and, against her struggles, did it well although not to my contentment’; ‘at last I had my way’. 
76 In the period of the diary we see something similar when James Carkesse was removed as a 
clerk in the navy office in 1666 for corrupt irregularities, but got himself reappointed: he 
went on to accuse Pepys and his colleagues of paying a privateer in their ownership rather 
than the sailors of a royal navy ship: Letters of Samuel Pepys, ed. De la Bédoyère 79. 
77 Bodl., MS Rawlinson, A 173, ff. 178–9: testimony of John James; A 175, ff. 210–14: 
information of Felix Donlius about James receiving money; ff. 215–17: declaration of John 
James. James admitted receiving about £12 from Harbord but also the promise of preferment. 
Further details are to be found in the journal Pepys kept about his dealings with James, 
published in Pepys’s Later Diaries, ed. Knighton, 82–117, which make it clear that Harbord 
extracted a confession from James denying that he had bribed him to accuse Pepys. Long and 
Long, Plot against Pepys. See also Peter Hinds, ‘The Horrid Popish Plot’: Roger L'Estrange 
and the Circulation of Political Discourse in Late Seventeenth-Century London (Oxford, 
2010). The tract is considered by Arthur Bryant but James’s allegations are described as 
‘rather puerile’: Arthur Bryant, Samuel Pepys: The Years of Peril (1967), 212.   
78 Bodl., MS Rawlinson, A 175, ff. 215–17: declaration by John James, as he lay sick and 
dying. The copy of the dialogue written by James, retrieved from Francis Smith who 
‘corrected it’, is at Bodl., MS Rawlinson, A 173, ff. 180–3. James’s declaration also makes 
clear that he received 20s. for the pamphlet from the dissenting bookseller and publisher, 
Benjamin Harris. 
79 Bodl., MS Rawlinson, A 175, ff. 215–7; ff. 220–1: the testimony of the cleric Adam 
Littleton; A 179, f. 48: Felix Donlius to Hewer, 6 Feb. 1688. 
80 Bodl. MS Rawlinson, A 175, f. 224: information of Alex Harris, 24 Mar. 1679[/80]; 
Pepys’s Later Diaries, ed. Knighton, 104. 
81 James claimed that he had been given money by Harbord when he had sent him the ‘libel’ 
about Pepys and Hewer: Pepys’s Later Diaries, ed. Knighton, 102. 
82 K.H.D. Hailey, The First Earl of Shaftesbury (1968), 154–6. 
83 Diary, 23 Sept. 1667.  
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
84 For a helpful discussion see Mark Philp, ‘Defining Political Corruption’, Political Studies 
xlv (1997), 436-62 – which discusses Pepys at p.443. 
85 Noonan, Bribes, 377. Later in his career Pepys even sought to expose and correct, through 
a series of printed pamphlets, what he saw as mismanagement, unaccounted outgoings and 
‘self-interest’ at Christ’s Hospital [Mr. Pepys to the President and Governours of Christ-
Hospital upon the present state of the said hospital (1698), paper V. For a discussion of the 
tracts see Kate Loveman, ‘Pepys in Print, 1660-1703’, Oxford Handbooks Online 
(forthcoming) and I am grateful to her for drawing these tracts to my attention. 
86 Bryant, Years of Peril, 213. 
87 For the development of the fiscal-military state see John Brewer, Sinews of Power: War, 
Money and the English State 1688–1783 (1989). 
88 Pepys himself used corruption in a number of different but compatible ways. Thus, as well 
as castigating the corruption of Batten and the court, he used the verb ‘corrupt’ to mean 
leading astray: one maid endeavoured ‘to corrupt our cook maid’ (Diary, 9 Apr. 1663), and 
he was annoyed at his servant ‘Will’s corrupting the mayds with his idle talke and carriage’ 
(Diary, 31 Oct. 1663). 
89 A Hue and Cry, 6. [IS THIS RIGHT?  See above] 
90 For literature on friendship and gift-giving, see Illana Ben Amos, The Culture of Giving in 
Early Modern England (Cambridge, 2008); The Culture of the Gift in Eighteenth Century 
England, ed. Cynthia Klekar and Linda Zionowski (Basingstoke, 2009); Felicity Heal, ‘Food 
Gifts, The Household and the Politics of Exchange in Early Modern England’, Past & Present 
199 (2008), 41-70; Sarah Haggarty, Blake’s Gifts: Poetry and the Politics of Exchange 
(Cambridge, 2010). For patronage, see Peck, Court Patronage. 
91 Graham, ‘Partisan Politics and the British Fiscal-Military State’, passim. 
92 For a helpful discussion of the social and cultural manufacture of credit, see Craig 
Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early 
Modern England (New York, 1998). 
93 Peck, Court Patronage, 4. 
94 Della Casa, The Arts of Grandeur (1665), 6, trans. Henry Stubbe.  
95 Casa, Arts of Grandeur, 12–13. 
96 Casa, Arts of Grandeur, 14. 
97 Casa, Arts of Grandeur, 49. 
98 Casa, Arts of Grandeur, 17. 
24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
99 Aylmer, ‘From Office-Holding to Civil Service’, 92–4. The tract is The Present Condition 
of the English Navy Set Forth in a Dialogue (1702), and the discussion of public and private 
interests occurs at pp. 3–4. 
100 Harling, Waning of ‘Old Corruption’; Philip Harling, ‘Parliament, the State, and “Old 
Corruption”: Conceptualising Reform, c.1790–1832’, in Rethinking the Age of Reform, ed. A. 
Burns and J. Innes (Cambridge, 2003); Harling, ‘Rethinking Old Corruption’, 127–58; 
Rubinstein, ‘The End of "Old Corruption" in Britain’, 55–86. 
101 Roberts, ‘Party and Patronage’, 185–212. 
